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Abstract: 
The strengthening of EU-Canada relations in the last years has revealed mutual interests in several 
policy fields. In times of increasingly tense relations with the US and weakening multilateralism, 
deepened and broadened bilateral cooperation is of particular importance for both, Canada and the EU. 
In order to better understand mutual interests and similar challenges, this article explores cooperation 
in the two different policy fields of foreign and security policy and climate change policy. This analysis of 
the current situation in international security and climate change policy points out key areas in which 
closer EU-Canada cooperation could be brought to bear fruits not only for their bilateral relationship 
but also the alliance for multilateralism in the short run and for years to come. 
Key words: Canada, EU, Security, Climate, multilateralism 
Introduction  
The EU-Canada relations have been strengthened in the last years. Both, the EU and 
Canada rely for the success of their economic growth models on a free trade regime that 
is built on transparent and reliable international rules. Since the Declaration on Canada-
European Community Transatlantic Relations in 1990 both sides have gradually 
extended their economic cooperation. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA), cooperation in climate change leadership and the 
Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) on foreign and security policy in 2016 illustrate 
the development of this partnership as well as the following assessment by EEAS Deputy 
Secretary General Pedro Serrano: “The EU-Canada relationship – like brandy – has 
gotten better and better with age” (Serrano, 2016). The EU-Canada Summit in July 2019 
highlighted the convergence of values and cooperation in a number of areas. The shared 
commitments include in particular the fight against climate change, the protection of the 
environment and oceans. As a result, the EU and Canada signed the Ocean Partnership.  
An enhanced EU-Canada cooperation on the technical level was recently demonstrated 
through various events such as at the annual gathering of foreign ambassadors in the 




countries like Italy, France, have stepped in to offer diplomatic support in Tehran in 
wake of Ukraine airliner crash where more than 60 Canadians died; Canada suspended 
diplomatic relations with Iran in 2012. 
In times of strongly contested outcomes of other diplomatic formats such as G7-summits 
like in Canada June 2018 and in Taormina in 2017, these bilateral forms of co-operation 
are becoming more relevant. It is likely that communiqués of the G7 belong to a bygone 
era of great power politics in which it was important which state asserted itself. Informal 
politics lack accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness. In the 21st century, when the 
challenges are more globally networked than ever – digitization is just one example 
among many – states must act at different levels of governance. What matters for 
legitimacy is the outcome. In 2018, Justin Trudeau’s government with its “progressive 
agenda” (Trudeau, 2017) proposed five major themes for multilateral cooperation in the 
context of Canada’s G7 presidency. These five were again a stark reminder of the mutual 
interests of Canada and the EU in international cooperation: Investing in growth that 
works for everyone, preparing for jobs for the future, advancing gender equality and 
women empowerment, working together on climate change, oceans and clean energy, 
and building a more peaceful and secure world (Canada’s G7 Presidency website, 
online). Two of these themes, namely the focus on peace and security, and climate 
change are directly linked to currently politically contested foreign and security issues. 
Not only disputes in NATO with the U.S. administration, also Donald Trump’s 
withdrawal from the multilateral Paris Agreement on climate change give new 
importance to the ‘alliance for multilateralism’.1  
In response to the dwindling support for a rule-based international order, the German 
government and France have initiated an “Alliance for Multilateralism” in September 
2018. Canada joined the Alliance for Multilateralism project in March 2019. “Many of 
today’s greatest challenges are global and can only be solved together. That is why 
Canada is united with its German, French and Japanese friends,” stated by Freeland at 
the time (Handelsblatt, online). The aim of the alliance, which consisted of more than 60 
countries in December 2019, was to promote cooperation among its members in various 
policy areas such as non-proliferation, emerging technologies, the protection of 
humanitarian aid workers and climate and security policy based on the rule-based order. 
The more successful the partners are to overcome their divergent interests, the more 
fruitful the cooperation will be.  
A mutual interest in democratic multilateralism makes them ideal partners for 
cooperation on reforms of multilateral institutions. A careful analysis of the current 
situation in international security and climate change policy points out key areas in 
which closer EU-Canada cooperation could be brought to bear fruit not only for their 
bilateral relationship but also the alliance for multilateralism in the short run and for 
years to come. It is about a shared understanding of democratic and not an instrumental 
view on multilateralism which serves as the basis of their commitment to security and 
climate change cooperation. 
  
                                                        
1 See Speech by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas at the opening of the 16th Ambassadors Conference at the Federal 
Foreign Office, 27.08.2018, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-freeland-am-bassadors-
conference/2130332 (accessed 12.01.2020).  
Bendiek and Schenuit, ANZJES 11(3) 
 
32 
Why EU-Canada?  
The thesis of the “end of the West” (Fukuyama, 1992) states that there is an ideological 
line of conflict of global political significance which, however, does not (as with 
Huntington (1996)) run between the West and the rest of the world, but within the West 
– namely between the United States (US) on the one hand and its Western European 
partners on the other. From a realistic point of view, however, the ties to the West were 
the guarantor of European integration. An important parameter of European integration 
is now disturbed by the transactional EU-US relationship. As a reaction, the former High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini 
announced in 2017 a “transactional policy towards the USA” (Mogherini, 2017). At the 
same time, Trump promotes disintegration by describing Brexit as a good idea or by 
fuelling the current tensions between Eastern and Western Europe over issues of 
understanding democracy and relations with Russia or the acceptance of the Chinese 
firm to build 5G networks in Europe. The USA is threatening “five eyes” intelligence-
sharing arrangements if Canada allows Huawei into its 5G network (CBC, 2019, online). 
Brexit puts the question of relations with third states on Brussel’s agenda and the 
accompanying uncertainty reinforces the motivation of both sides to work together. For 
a long time, the US was the most important and dominant partner for both Canada and 
the EU. However, given the current high volatility of US foreign policy, it can be seen as 
an external driver of cooperation between the EU and Canada. Also, both Canada and 
the EU could potentially increase their economic weight if they succeed in including 
recently negotiated CETA-standards (e.g. on labour, environment, rules of origin, public 
procurement, ISDS and even geographical indications) in new trade agreements with 
third parties. 
The strong strategic partnership between Canada and the EU does not preclude them 
from forming further bilateral partnerships with other countries. This is exemplified by 
the newly signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the EU and Japan2 and on-
going negotiations with Australia, New Zealand and the Mercosur-countries. Brussels 
and Ottawa, however, have already concluded the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) and can now focus on how to further develop political and strategic 
relations.  
Based on similar values and interests, this like-mindedness as well as an extensive set of 
agreements which evolved since 1976 makes the Union one of the closest and longest-
standing partners of Canada and vice versa. In the beginning, the relationship rested 
primarily on trade even though many of the EU member states and Canada have worked 
well together within NATO. Hence, regarding security policy Canada and the EU had 
long focused on multilateral cooperation within the Transatlantic Alliance but not 
between each other.  
Another important dimension of cooperation is the Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) (European Union, 2016). It divides the 
areas of responsibilities between NATO and the EU more precisely than before and 
aligns the latter closer to the Transatlantic Alliance. In accordance with the strategy, the 
Union takes responsibility for civil resilience, while NATO remains in charge of Europe’s 
                                                        
2 The EU-Japan negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) were finalized on 08 December 2017. In 
July 2018, Presidents Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk, and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed the 




military defence (Bendiek, 2016). Moreover, it called for better and closer cooperation 
with third states (European Union, 2016). Thus, it contributed to a clearer allocation of 
responsibilities, paving the way for strategic partnerships with third countries such as 
Canada. This particularly applies because the impending British withdrawal from the EU 
rein-forces the need to address this key issue.  
How has the EU-Canada partnership been designed and what are the concrete steps to 
strengthen the newly established Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2016? The concept 
of strategic partnership was much-discussed in the late 2000s. Offering no new 
initiatives or guiding principles but bundling old ones (Bendiek and Kramer, 2009, 
pp.12-13), this concept was perceived as a lack of fruitful and concrete results at that 
time. So, the strategic discussions shifted towards the Global Strategy in June 2016. 
Brexit and the questioning of EU-US relations on both sides of the Atlantic, turned the 
political attention towards alternative third state relations in EU external relations.  
The EU third state relationship concept might therefore revive the concept of strategic 
partnerships by addressing its previous structural weaknesses in design and 
effectiveness. Bilateral relations with third countries should serve in the interest of 
maintaining the right-based order which is the main objective of democratic 
multilateralism. In this sense, the EU should only be a means to the end of maintaining 
the multilateral order. Under the condition of globalisation, there can be no democracy 
only in one country, democracy is transnational, and democracy therefore needs to be 
supplemented (internationalisation of external effects). Otherwise, the law of the 
strongest prevails. The expression of democratic multilateralism is that the EU 
Commission is concentrating even more on ongoing trade talks with regions of the world 
beyond the US and link them to global issues such as climate and security policy. The 
CETA agreement with Canada and the revival of these relations are the prelude to the 
attempt to revive the concept of “strategic partnerships”. Negotiations with the South 
American Mercosur Group was signed. Agreements with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam 
are also to be ratified soon. Middle Size Multilateralism – the search for new partners 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand to protect the law-based order by means of 
these cooperative agreements with third countries – is the interest of the democratic 
multilateral actors like the EU and Canada. 
Foreign and security policy 
With the European Security Strategy of 2003, the EU wanted to promote “effective 
multilateralism”. Strategic partnerships were established with the USA, Canada, India, 
Brazil and Japan. As Sunghoon Park rightly pointed out: “Especially in the pursuit of 
fostering the functional logic in its strategic partnership, the EU tends to use the 
strategic partnership as a diplomatic tool to achieve specific aims rather than social and 
relational values in itself and therefore as an instrument to influence partner countries’ 
foreign policy” (Park, 2019, p. 259). The EUGS of June 2016 remains unambitious with 
regard to maintaining the international order on the basis of international law (Bendiek, 
2016). It is the last of the five EUGS objectives mentioned. Unlike the National Security 
Strategy, the EU does not combine security and trade policy objectives yet (Bendiek, 
2017).  
Nevertheless, some authors state that the EU is already a “geo-economic superpower” 
because of its economic and regulatory strength, because it is at the heart of a 
Eurosphere of 80 states that depend on trade with and investment from the EU 
Bendiek and Schenuit, ANZJES 11(3) 
 
34 
(Moravcsik, 2017). But how sustainable is Europe’s geo-economic power? With the 
world’s largest single market, the EU is able to ensure that multinationals comply with 
European rules and standards because they want to operate in the largest single market 
in the future. It blocked the merger of General Electric and Honeywall, forced Microsoft 
to decouple from the Explorer browser and made all companies subject to the basic EU 
data protection regulation. Companies that evade the rules, face drastic fines. 
The EU is in a self-imposed phase of reflection; its foreign policy identity (as ‘soft’ power 
and ‘transformative’ power) has historically become obsolete and was converted to the 
target of “resilience” with the EUGS (2016). The protection of Europe is regarded as the 
ultimate goal, politically formulated by the then President of the European Commission 
Jean-Claude Juncker. French President Emanuel Macron echoes with a vision of 
"l'Europe qui protège” where the cooperation with third countries is becoming essential 
to the maintenance of European security. Technocratically implemented through the 
establishment of a security union in the area of freedom, security and rule of law, 
defence union through PESCO, CARDS and the Defence Fund, as well as intensified EU-
NATO cooperation, especially in the context of territorial defence; digital sovereignty, 
externalisation of migration, “train and equip” missions in West Africa, development of a 
strategic culture with the aim of setting defence expenditure at 1.5 per cent, i.e. 20 
billion, by 2025 as stated by the German chancellor Merkel in 2018 (FAZ 2018). These 
are just a few of numerous initiatives launched since June 2016 as part of the 
implementation of the EUGS. 
According to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the EU and Canada “share a 
responsibility [to build] a more peaceful, and more secure world.” (Council of the 
European Union, 2018, online). Traditionally, the US were Canada’s closest ally, 
followed by the United Kingdom and France due to their historic and long-established 
relationships. Based on Canada’s constantly increased involvement in multilateral 
cooperation, this recently shifted towards a closer partnership with the EU. The first 
meeting of the EU-Canada Joint Ministerial Committee on December 04, 2017, 
identified deeper Security and Defense cooperation and the enhancing of “EU-Canada 
cooperation around the world” as two of their top three priorities for 2018 (Joint 
Statement, 2017, online). Finally, in July 2019, the EU and Canada reiterated their 
commitment to advancing gender equality and women’s rights in building peaceful 
inclusive societies for advancing security and resilience. 
The Strategic Partnership Agreement 2016  
Likewise, for Canada the EU is an obvious candidate to cooperate with. The Strategic 
Partnership Agreement (SPA) reflected on common interests and values and entrenched 
the common role as global actors of the two by a number of strategic dialogues. Among 
others the SPA led to the creation of new ones on cyber security, development, and 
counter terrorism. According to Garon (2016, p. 2), limited resources and the 
destabilization of the European security order in the light of Russian aggressions in 
Ukraine serve as Canada’s two key motifs for a closer partnership with the EU. 
Enhancing cooperation as well as complementarity between NATO and the EU is 
therefore in Canada’s national interest. Consequently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Chrystia Freeland calls “Canada’s partnership with its European allies […] more essential 
than ever” and reaffirms her countries’ commitment to shared interests and democratic 
values (Freeland, 2017). As both Canada and the EU assume more global responsibility, 




and effective. For these reasons, the two are each other’s best option as close strategic 
partners on the global level.  
Third state involvement in CFSP and CSDP  
Getting third states on board of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
activities can be understood as being in the interest of the EU. This applies even more 
when it comes to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). EU partnerships 
with third states have been given little visibility even if the contribution of partner 
countries is increasing.3  
The ongoing Brexit proceedings have underlined once more the relevance of this policy 
issue. Moreover, the question of future multilateral cooperation is part of the EU Global 
Strategy (2016) and its new Level of Ambition (LoA), namely: responding to external 
conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners and protecting the Union and its 
citizens (Council of the European Union, 2016b). In order to respond to the evolving 
challenges in the area of security and defence (migration, counter-terrorism and hybrid 
threats)(Council of the European Union, 2016a), the EEAS under High Representative 
Federica Mogherini was actively taking forward the enhancement of strategic 
CFSP/CSDP partnerships. In fulfilling these criteria, one of the key priorities is ensuring 
the EU’s own resilience through an integrated approach to conflicts and crises and the 
reinforcement of global governance based on international law (Council of the European 
Union, 2016a). The EU-NATO agreement in June 2016 was a step towards a deeper EU-
cooperation with one of its principal partners, but foremost an immediate reaction to the 
changing transatlantic bond with the US. Furthermore, this new outreach towards third 
countries by the EU and its very own security and defence concerns, adds credibility to 
the recent decisions in CSDP matters and the resilience approach of the EU as a whole. 
The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), decided upon in December 2017, as a 
process of closer cooperation in security and defence forms part of this revival of 
strategic partnerships. In accordance with Articles 4(2)(g) and 9(1) of Decision (CFSP) 
2017/2315, the European Council will set out the general conditions for exceptional 
third-state participation in PESCO projects and their compliance with these in June 
2018 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2018). 
With this in mind, a future Canadian contribution to PESCO takes concrete shape, while 
new opportunities of cooperation, besides the increasing consultations and coordination 
in multilateral fora such as the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), are opening up. 
How does the EU reach out to such third state parties in order to guarantee a mutual 
commitment? The EU to this day provides six forms of CSDP-cooperation: Framework 
Participation Agreement (FPA), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Migration 
Compacts, Political Dialogues on counter-terrorism, cooperation with host-countries as 
well as candidate and potential candidate countries through a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement/SAA. Canada signed an FPA in November 2005 but has also 
contributed to missions and operations within the Western Balkans countries (EUFOR 
Althea, EULEX Kosovo, EUPM BiH and EUFOR Concordia). As one of the most 
                                                        
3 Canada’s involvement in the past: EUPM BiH, Concordia, Artemis, EUFOR Althea, EUPOL Kinshasa, EULEX 
Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan. Currently: EUPOL COPPS and EUAM Ukraine – as well as providing a financial 
contribution to the military operation to EUTM Mali. 
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consistent contributors to the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine, Agriteam Canada on 
behalf of the Canadian Global Affairs Office has realized various projects. Agriteam 
Canada provides management and technical expertise on projects that promote 
sustainable growth and meaningful opportunities for people to improve their living 
conditions. The Canadian EUAM portfolio ranges from Police Training Assistance 
Projects (2016–2019), support of a Patrol Police Reform (2015-2016) and a Juvenile 
Justice Reform Project (2007–2017) to an Expert Deployment for Governance and 
Economic Growth (2014-2019) (Agriteam Canada, 2018). The Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police has also visited EUAM in order to discuss co-operation and coordination in 
supporting efforts for the Civil Security Sector reform in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine, 
2015).  
In light of fading enthusiasm for the Mali mission on the Canadian side (Gordon, 2017) 
as a result of the likely casualties and the complex nature of the conflict became 
increasingly apparent, a more developed civil engagement within EU-CSDP structures 
seems appealing to both partners. The Security and Defense Dialogue, established in 
May 2015, and the first Joint Ministerial Committee – co-chaired by Chrystia Freeland 
and Federica Mogherini – held in December 2017 put forward an agreement allowing for 
the exchange of classified information between them (Council of the European Union, 
2017).  
In order to use CSDP as a tool to provide expertise and assistance to the EU and its 
partners, strategic communication, border security, but also cyber security are relevant. 
Cybersecurity as one of the key priorities within the framework of a common EU-CSDP 
policy. This matter was also a top priority for the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in 
February 2018. “Secure digital networks are the critical infrastructure underpinning our 
interconnected world” (Freeland cited by Siemens, 2018) as the Canadian foreign 
minister Chrystia Freeland pointed out. The launch of a Digital Trust Initiative by 
Siemens and other industry partners during the MSC is an important step towards 
advancing this crucial topic. Freeland continues by stating that “Canada welcomes the 
efforts of these key industry players to help create a safer cyberspace” (Freeland cited by 
Siemens, 2018) and thereby highlights the importance of this initiative. The renewed EU 
Cybersecurity Strategy of 2017 encourages stronger links between the EU and other 
stakeholders in cybersecurity. The global dimension of the internet creates a need for the 
EU to further enhance appropriate international fora in order to “promote EU values 
and norms in respect of cybersecurity” (ENISA, 2017). 
Cooperation in climate policy: an example of broadening relations  
In the context of increasingly urgent responses to climate change, the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement in 2015 as well as the announced withdrawal of the Trump 
Administration, climate change has become an integral part of foreign policy initiatives 
in recent years – within formal UN processes and beyond. In addition to established 
informal formats such as the G7 or G20, initiatives such as the ‘Alliance for 
Multilateralism’ and the SPA between Canada and the EU now also refer to climate 
change as an issue of international cooperation and support the formal UN processes. 
This development can be understood as an extension of the scope of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation on climate change. Especially since Canada's Prime Minister 
Trudeau announced in 2015 his plan to restore Canada's international reputation as a 
climate pioneer after his predecessor Stephen Harper slowed down Canada’s ambitions 




have a mutual interest and face similar internal challenges in climate change. An 
overview of different international initiatives show that Canada and the EU explore 
various fora to exchange and coordinate their views and positions on climate change 
issues.  
Climate change in the Strategic Partnership Agreement and 
“Alliance for Multilateralism” 
When Canada and the EU agreed on the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2016, they 
specifically addressed the “global threat of climate change and the need to take 
immediate and further action to cut emissions” (SPA, Art. 12.8). In addition, they agreed 
on support the rules-based regime under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and highlight the Paris Agreement as well as high-level 
dialogues between the countries to share best practices and promote “effective and 
inclusive cooperation on climate change” (SPA, Art. 12.9).  
A joint declaration of the 17th Canada-EU summit in July 2019 follows up on that and 
states that the SPA provides a platform for cooperation on issues such as climate change 
(Canada-EU Summit Joint Declaration, 2019). In addition to that, the declaration states 
that the trade agreement: “CETA enables greater cooperation between Canada and the 
EU to address climate change and other global environmental challenges” (Canada-EU 
Summit Joint Declaration, 2019, I.8). Furthermore, the declaration refers to scientific 
knowledge of the IPCC, ongoing UN procedures such as UNFCCC negotiations and 
several other climate-related issues such as the Arctic, oceans and plastics.  
The SPA shows clearly that the issue of climate change is an integral part of the bilateral 
cooperation under the SPA between Canada and the EU and that both countries support 
the approach of rules-based multilateralism through their bi-lateral cooperation.  
Climate Change has also been explicitly addressed in the context of the “Alliance for 
Multilateralism”. One of the six initiatives of this alliance is called “The Climate and 
Security Initiative”. In this section, the parties address the importance of UNFCCC’s 
Paris Agreement as well as the threats to international peace and security by impacts of 
climate change. In addition to this, the alliance calls for “tools to analyse and act on the 
consequences of climate change for international peace and security” (France 
Diplomatie, 2019). Alliances like this provides an additional platform for exchange and 
coordination of like-minded countries like the Canada and the EU – this form of 
cooperation and coordination can be an important supplement to the formal UN 
negotiations under the UNFCCC.  
G-formats and climate diplomacy  
A closer look at the events of climate change-related developments in international 
politics in recent years shows that the informal G-formats can be important fora for 
climate diplomacy. The G-formats have repeatedly played an important role in 
international climate diplomacy. For example, under the German G7 presidency in 2015, 
when the “decarbonization of the global economy” target was included in the final 
communiqué (G7, 2015). The negotiations in Elmau are regarded as important 
preparatory work for the Paris Agreement, which was successfully negotiated at the end 
of 2015. During the G20 summit in Hangzhou in 2016, only six months after the 
conclusion of the negotiations on the Paris Agreement, Barack Obama and Xi Jinping 
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announced the joint ratification of the agreement, which was one of the most important 
prerequisites for its entry into force. When Donald Trump took office, these climate 
policy success stories from the G-summits were put on hold. The G7 summits 2017 in 
Italy and 2018 in Canada for example, were mainly shaped by the blockade of the US 
government. 
Despite this latest development, the past G-groups summit show that informal 
diplomatic formats can be relevant for like-minded partners as Canada and the EU to 
coordinate their positions, build alliances and therefore contribute to progress in 
international climate policy. It should also not be underestimated that they are relevant 
as recurring platforms for exchange at the highest political level on climate change 
related issues.  
Mutual interests – similar challenges 
The development of Canada's role in climate policy illustrates that it is worth 
maintaining and developing international agreements even if crucial contractual 
partners decide to withdraw from the agreement: For Canada, it is by no means a 
granted matter that it counts itself among climate policy pioneers on the international 
stage. Over the last four decades, Canada’s position in the international climate 
negotiations has changed several times (Maciunias and de Lassus Saint-Geniès, 2018). 
During the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol (adopted in 1997), for example, it played 
an important role in reaching a consensus between the US and the EU. In 2011 – four 
years after Stephen Harper took over the government – Canada withdrew from the 
agreement. Harper was much more critical of the multilateral negotiations and refrained 
from active climate multilateralism (Maciunias and de Lassus Saint-Geniès, 2018). After 
Justin Trudeau was elected as the new Prime Minister in 2015, the climate policy 
ambitions changed significantly. Trudeau announced that Canada was “back” and that 
he wanted to establish its international reputation and pioneering role in the fight 
against climate change (Maciunias and de Lassus Saint-Geniès, 2018). During the 
climate negotiations in Paris, the Canadian delegation was then part of the High 
Ambition Coalition, which, among other things, negotiated for the incorporation of the 
1.5°C target in the final text. Following Paris, the government also translated these 
ambitions into bilateral agreements. Important partners include China and the EU, 
which have agreed on tripartite cooperation with Canada. Together with the United 
Kingdom and 20 other countries, Canada is also part of the “Powering Past Coal 
Alliance”, which was officially launched at the 23rd UN climate conference in Bonn in 
2017.  
Beyond the international stage, however, Justin Trudeau’s government is repeatedly 
criticised for not implementing the announced goals in domestic politics. He was also 
criticized shortly after taking office, when he decided to take over the nationally 
determined contribution for the Paris Agreement (NDC) of his predecessor Stephen 
Harper without increasing ambition.  
Prior to his re-election in 2019, Trudeau chose climate policy as one if his main 
priorities. In their election manifesto, the Liberals calls for net-zero emissions by 2050 
and propose legally binding, five-year milestones for emissions based on scientific advice 
and consultations with the Canadians (Liberals, 2019). The priority of more ambitious 
climate policy was also addressed in the speech from the throne, which referred to the 




climate change, however, has been one reason for regional divide between eastern and 
western Provinces (New York Times, 2019). In his last term, Trudeau tried to bridge this 
gap with rather ambiguous policies of proposing a carbon price and international climate 
leadership on the one hand and buying pipelines on the other. Unsurprisingly, he has 
been criticized from both sides of the political spectrum.  
Although the EU has long been known internationally as a climate pioneer, the gap 
between internationally announced targets and actual climate policy at home also exists 
in European countries (Climate Action Tracker for the EU, online). This applies not only 
to existing legislation such as 2030 targets, but also to its long-term strategies. For now, 
the EU member states are far from being on track to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. 
The ambitious roadmap “EU Green Deal” towards climate neutrality by 2050 provides a 
conceptual framework and time schedule for this transformation. But the road to legally 
binding legislation is still a long one, and opposition from some regions and member 
states is to be expected (Geden and Schenuit, 2019). 
The fact that Canada and the EU are facing similar internal political challenges may give 
rise to mutual interests in enhanced cooperation. New forms of cooperation could help 
to exchange on possibilities to find solutions for “just transitions” in fossil fuel rich 
regions and thereby overcome internal political challenges on the way towards net-zero 
emissions. The potential for new impetus, ambition and intensified cooperation lies in 
the following three areas.  
Firstly, one way forward for Canada-EU cooperation would be to try to reach a 
consensus between the remaining six and nineteen countries in the G-formats as well as 
the ‘Alliance for Multilateralism’ concerning the ambitious implementation of the Paris 
Agreement. Sending a strong signal to climate diplomacy at UN level would increase the 
credibility and effectiveness of the multilateral agreement. If states could agree to set 
more ambitious voluntary commitments, the gap between internationally agreed 
declarations of intent and the missed target achievement at national level could be 
narrowed.  
Secondly, the EU and Canada could lay the foundations for extending the climate policy 
negotiations to new fields of international policy such as international trade policy 
(Dröge and Schenuit, 2018). In the field of trade policy, the EU-Canada CETA trade 
agreement already incorporates links to the Paris Agreement. Shaping new forms of 
linkages between these policy fields could therefore be one building block of EU-Canada 
multilateral leadership and could play a pioneering role for future free trade agreements. 
Thirdly, abandoning subsidies for the fossil fuel industry offers potential for future 
cooperation of Canada and the EU. The pledge to reduce them is well known from G7/8 
meetings. It first entered declarations of a G8 meeting in 2009 (G8 Communiqué, 
2009). In 2016, the G7 agreed on elimination of fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 (G7 
Communiqué, 2016). The latest G-format communiqués however did not contain such 
formulation. A reintroduction of this aspect in the final communiqués – at least 
supported by the remaining six – could reaffirm the agreement already reached in 2016. 
Canada and the EU could also go ahead and cooperate on the simultaneous elimination 
of fossil fuel subsidies – a political decision that would be more likely followed by actual 
subsidies reductions if they agree on a joint initiative.  
  




The strengthening of EU-Canada relations in the last years has revealed mutual interests 
in several policy fields. In times of increasingly tense relations with the US, deepened 
and broadened cooperation is of particular importance for both, Canada and the EU. 
Closer EU-Canada relations are in their mutual interest. Especially in a situation in 
which the US foreign policy is increasingly erratic and unreliable, and the existence of 
multilateral institutions and agreements are seriously called into question. In this 
context, the “Alliance for Multilateralism” provides important communication channels 
against an instrumental understanding of multilateralism. The influx to populist parties 
in numerous EU countries, which find great pleasure in the populist/nationalist Trump 
politics, is a further incentive for promoting instrumental multilateralism. In this 
understanding, a “Europe of nation states” and foreign-policy unilateralism is an 
expression of instrumental multilateralism. Poland and the Baltic states conclude short-
term deals with the US administration in order to buy security guarantees from the US. 
Germany’s foreign energy policy is also an example of this. 
Even though the US government may become isolated when Canada and the EU actively 
pursuing their cooperation in security, trade and climate policy, this alliance between the 
two can contribute to securing what has been achieved multilaterally so far and maybe 
even initiate progress in these policy fields. Future cooperation agreements are to be 
seen in the context of the provisional application of the SPA and enable the 
accomplishment of the three agreed-upon actions: strengthening the EU-Canada 
bilateral relationship, enhancing the foreign policy coordination and addressing the 
global challenges and opportunities. A closer strategic partnership serves to fulfil 
growing worldwide responsibilities by Canada and the EU and increase their ability and 
potential to make a global impact. Hence, the implementation of all the SPA policies as 
well as the advancement of them in the Joint Ministerial Committee and other fora like 
the UN are vital for EU-Canada relations. Overall, the following conclusions can be 
drawn for the policy areas of security and climate change.  
Given the importance of third-country involvement in European foreign and security 
policy EU-Canada relations should comprise two dimensions, which are equally 
important from an EU perspective: the first one is capacity-related, the second one is 
rather political (Tardy, 2014). To advance their common interests in promoting effective 
multilateralism, the EU and Canada have to foster the domestic commitment for their 
individual contribution for the UN and its specialized organizations and agencies, as well 
as the OECD, the NATO, the OSCE and other multilateral fora. At the same time, it is 
important that the EU and Canada work on common definitions related to strengthening 
transatlantic security. This should take into account the central role of the existing 
transatlantic security architecture between Europe and North America under the 
condition of the “America first” policy pursued under the current US-administration 
under Donald Trump. The EU might facilitate Canadian participation in PESCO projects 
(see also Leuprecht, 2019, in this Special Issue) but also in cyber diplomacy including 
the sharing of planning information regarding crisis management and capacity-building 
in third countries and further enhance their cooperation in this regard including on EU 
missions and operations. The goal is to enlarge the current strategic partnership 
agreement to a security partnership equivalent to the well-developed EU-Norway 




Past missions and operations have shown that the EU has been struggling to staff its very 
own missions. Fulfilling these priorities means that the EU for its part may either deploy 
non-executive CSDP civilian missions and military operations – upon invitation of the 
host country to provide strategic advice, training, mentoring and monitoring or it could 
build on permanent security cooperation with relevant third state partners such as 
Canada.  
The PESCO agreement represents another attempt to enlarge the pool of possible 
contributors to future EU-activities in the field of security and defence. Accordingly, a 
Canadian PESCO contribution civilian and/or military – is a medium-term step and in 
this case, Canada should already be involved in the initial phase. Establishing a genuine 
format for seconded personnel might be another promising step towards substantiating 
this cooperation. The long-term success of the EU crisis management – e.g. in North 
Africa – will depend on such midterm decisions.  
In times of weakening multilateralism and conflicts with the US administration, 
pursuing mutual interests on issues such climate change would not only be a clear 
statement of support for multilateral agreements such as the Paris Agreement but could 
also put cooperation on a broader footing and unleash new synergies. In the upcoming 
years, it will be crucial to support the Paris Agreement framework by adopting and 
implementing ambitious climate policies in line with the multilaterally agreed targets. As 
Canada and the EU are facing similar political hurdles to adapt ambitious climate policy 
domestically, a closer cooperation could contribute to overcome the widening gap 
between climate ambitions agreed upon internationally and the actual domestic climate 
policies. In particular, trying to find common ground in bilateral cooperation and 
transfer the dialogue to the G-formats could be an important contribution to keep the 
topic of climate change on the top of the agenda of heads of states. The ‘alliance for 
multilateralism’ can have a similar function and provide important forum for exchange 
and coordination between like-minded countries. Canada and the EU have the capacities 
to shape these climate change-relevant cooperation proactively.  
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